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Cert to CA 9 (Merrill, 
Cummings, Sneed; memo) 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
SU~~RY: Petr contends that he is entitled to relief under § 2255 
from the Board of Parole's denial of parole, which petr and the DC 
(~ckham) say frustrated the DC's intentions in sentencing petr. 
FACTS: Petr was sentenced to 5 years on each of four counts, the 
sentences to run concurrently. sentence was imposed under what is now 
18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (2) (1976) [that portion of Title 18 was recodified 
by the Parole Comm'n & Reorganization Act of 1976; this memo gives 
the current section numbers, the original section was 4208(a) (2)]. 





DJ imposes a definite sentence and the prisoner is eligible for parole 
after serving one third of his sentence or ten years. Under § 4205(b) 
(1) (1976) the DJ imposes both a minimum and a maximum sentence; the 
prisoner is eligible for parole at any time after serving the minimum 
and less than one third of the maximum. Under§ 4205(b) (2) the DJ 
"""IDI,TI '-Y 
sets only the maximum sentence; the prisoner is~eligible for parole 
at the discretion of the Board of Parole. Petr's sentence was impo ~. ed 
under the latter section. Petr now argues that the DJ's expectation 
was that he would be paroled if he showed satisfactory adaptation to 
prison life. 
Petr began serving his sentence in Aug 1972. In Nov 1973 the Bd 
of Parole published its new guidlines, 38 Fed Reg 31942 [28 CFR § 2.2 0 
which did not treat sentencing under § 4205(b) (2) as significant. 
The Bd refused to recommend parole in ,Jan 1975, after having denied an 
earlier hearing in Nov 1974. After petr served one third of his 
sentence the Bd again denied parole. Petr then filed this § 2255 
action in DC, claiming that he had been denied due process by the 
increased severity of his senten~ The DC agreed that the Bd's actio 
thwarted his intentions; so, the DC vacated the original sentence, 
resentenced petr to four, concurrent five-year sentences, suspended t h 
~
sentences and imposed a probation term of five years. 
v 
HOLDING BELOW: CA 9 reversed, holding that the DC had no juris-
diction under § 2255 to modify the sentence. The CA relied upon its 
previous decision in Andrino v. United States, 550 F.2d 519 (1977), 
in which it had held that habeas corpus was the proper procedure for 
obtaining judicial review of the parole board's decision. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the DJ had misapprehended the 
implications of the sentence for later parole. According to petr ther 
was a general understanding that by sentencing under§ 4205(b) (2) the 
DJ would ensure that the parole board considered only the prisoner's 
conduct while in prison. In particular, the DJ thought that the Bd 
would not take into account the type of illegal act and the prisoner's 
prior record. When the Bd introduced its salient factors for deter-
mining eligibility for parole it included the very considerations which 
the DJ had assumed would be excluded. Petr ~ontends that that inclu-
sion of additional factors thwarted the DJ's intent, thereby dening 
petr due process. 
Petr also contends that there is a conflict among the circuits. 
The 9th Cir is aligned with the 1st in holding that section 2255 cannot 
be used to challenge the Bd's action. See United States v McBride, 
560 F.2d 7 (CA 1 1977). Opposing those cases are the 3rd and 8th Cirs . 
t~·, 
See-pnited States v. Salerno, 53S F.2d 1005 (CA3 1976); Kortness v. 
---,~ 
United States, 514 F.2d 167 (CAS 1975). 
SG does not oppose cert, but suggests that the better course would 
be to hold this case pending disposition of two others v1hich pose 
similar issues. United States v. Addonizio, 573 F.2d 147 (CA3 1978) 
(Aldisert, Hunter; Cahn, DJ), cert applied for, docket no. 28-156, 
involved a sentence under § 4205(a). The DJ found that his intentions 
had been frustrated by the Bd's actions. The CA affirmed, based upon 
its decision in Salerno. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937 (CAS 
1978) (Bright; Henley, concur; Stephenson, dissent), cert applied for, 
docket no 78-157, involved a sentence under§ 4205(b) (2). The DJ 
found that the Bd's actions had not frustrated his intentions. Never-
theless, the CA reversed, saying that the Bd had not given meaningful 
consideration to the prisoner's application for parole. Without meanin 
ful consideration, the DJ's intentions could not have been followed. 
SG suggests that in Addonizio and Edwards the Court is confronted 
c 
with the full diversity of issues that arise because of the Bd's 
policies with respect to parole. As a result, the SG does not 
think that a grant of cert is warranted in a third case involving 
the same issues. SG does not discuss the question of the propriety 
of § 2255 for making this challenge. 
DISCUSSION: With the split among the circuits there is need for 
this Court to resolve the question of whether a sentence may be 





SG's description, this case presents the additional question of 
propriety of the use of § 2255 as opposed to habeas corpus. With 
7 
CA's decision in this case there is now an additional S?lit over 
---------=-
the procedural route to follow in reviewing the parole board's ac ion. 
----------------------------------------------------~ 
Since there are at least three similar cases before the Court, they 
should be discussed together; and, possibly , the Legal Office should 
be asked to review these and any other similar cases to deter~ine which 
should be argued orally. 
There is a response. 
8/21/78 Pratt Ops in petn 
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UNITED STATES ~ ~A;:/ 
~ ~) .~~~ 
ADDONIZIO (fed. prisoner) &~wt-1 - . ~./ f' 2-~ s-r 
.. C~:s' 
UNITED STATES ~"' "1 - cJ....{~ J ~ ~ ~  
v. y~ / ~4 ~~~ 
~ELAN and FLAHERTY (fed. priso~ers) Federal/Civil (Habeas) Timely 
SUMMARY: The SG seeks review of a decision ot:r-"~~ . 
S 6 ·.5, ~ /- /""JA1~A 
Sv~l;, holding that, on a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C o § 2255:~ ~~~ 
/>1~, - • d h . 1 ful .9'- A - - /"~- L - ~~ It 
c Ple',;t '? a sentenc1.ng court may re uce an ot erw1.se aw se~ 
~ · upon a showing that the sentencing judge's expect~ ions were "'~"' <.. 
t frustrated by a subsequent change in Parole Comm~~ ~ 
~/(s'*{~. 
~/Time for filing extended by Mr. Justice Brennan to July 27. 
~.,/ · / _ t? r-c9n/ny .rh~ /.J e/n . 
~ ,-~ c:.a........,,....,- 0"" ~sc-u.ss~o, JA"'~r;r di' V"~ TV v v-=;--;;. / <.::.c ......... ""•"~ o, -pacL) ~,............,__ 
v. 
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FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: FederaL trial courts may rely 
on three different statutory provisions in sentencing an --offender, each having different implications for parole. 
The judge may impose a straight sentence, with eligibility 
for parole after service of one-third of the sentence. 18 
U.S.C. § 4205(a). Alternatively, .the judge may impose an 
indeterminate sentence with minimum and maximum period of 
confinement specified. Id. § 4205(b)(l). Finally, the judge 
may impose an indeterminate sentence with no minimum and only 
a maximum period of confinement specified. Id. § 4205(b)(2). 
Once a prisoner is eligible for parole, the Parole Commission 
has broad discretion in deciding whether to release the prison-
er. Id. § 4206(a). 
The prisoners in this case, described more ntlly below, 
were sentenced under the first provision, § 4205(a). Prior 
to 1973, trial courts apparently assumed that prisoners 
sentenced under this provision would be released upon completion 
of one-third of the sentence, given a good institutional record 
and no finding of probable recidivism. After 1973, however, 
the Commission began relying on published guidelines in making 
I 
parole decisions. These guidelines focussed not only on insti-
tutional behavior and the liklihood of recidivism, but also 
on the nature of the crime the prisoner had committed. In 1976, 
Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 
amending § 4206(a) to make it explicit that the Commission 
should consider whether release on parole would "depreciate 
the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for 
the law." . :; 
This case involves three district court decisions consolidated 
-3-
together on appeal. 
/ The first case, United States v. Addonizio, involved 
../' 
the former Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, who had been convicted 
of conspiracy and extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1951, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and 
a $25,000 fine. Resp. Addonizio became eligible for parole . 
on July 3, 1975, after serving on-third of hi~ sentence. How-
ever, although Addonizio had been a model prisoner and was 
considered to present no danger of recidivism, he was not 
released on parole. The Commission explained that Addonizio's 
crimes had demonstrated such a breach of public trust that 
to release him would depreciate the seriousness of his offenses 
and promote disrespect for the law. 
Addonizio then filed this motion for resentencing pursuant 
L to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The DC (Barlow) expressly stated that, in sentencing 
Addonizio, he had anticipated that, with good behavior, Addonizio would 
remain in prison only 3 1/2 to 4 years. The judge had consider-
ed this the appropriate length of confinement given the severity of 
Addonizio's offenses. Under the law of the CA 3, the DC found 
that he had jurisdiction to consider Addonizio's grievance 
under § 2255. Accordingly, the court reduced the sentence to 
time served. 
The second and third cases involved resps. Whelan, the 
former Mayor, and Flaherty, a former city councilman, of Jersey 
City, New Jersey. They too had been convicted of conspiracy 
and extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, and had been 
sentenced by DJ Shaw to 15 years imprisonment. They became eli-
gible for parole in 1976 after serving one-third of their 
sentences. However, the Commission refused to release Whelan 
and Flaherty on parole, explaining that their offenses were 
-4-
part of large-scale organized criminal activity and involved 
~ a breach of the public trust. 
Whelan and Flaherty then filed two suits challenging their 
confinement. The first, a motion for relief under § 2255, 
was assigned to Judge Biunno, Judge Shaw having died. Resps. 
argued that the denial of parole had frustrated Judge Shaw's 
expectations, and thus that their sentences should be reduced. 
The DC found that he had no jurisdiction to consider this 
claim under § 2255, the proper avenue of relief being general 
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005 
as a 
(CA 3 1976), upholding such jurisdiction under§ 2255,was distinguished/ 
case where the denial of parole violated the explicit state-
ments of the sentencing judge. Even if jurisdiction 
was available under § 2255, the DC would deny the relief sought, 
since the "spectacle of Whelan and Flaherty being paroled and 
free to escape with their ill-gotten gains" was "revolting." 
The second suit was a § 2241 petition filed in the district 
of confinemento The DC (Muir) found that the proper mode of 
relief was a § 2255 motion, and since Judge Biunno's decision 
was likely to be reversed on appeal, the DC declined to address 
the frustration of expectations argument. Turning to the 
question whether the denial of probation was arbitrary and capricious un-
der § 2241, the DC held that in light of the nature of Whelan's 
and Flaherty's crimes it was not. 
TheCA affirmed Addonizio, vacated and remanded Whelan's 
~ 
and Flaherty's § 2255 action, and affirmed Whelan's and Flaherty's 
§ 2241 action. The court reaffirmed the holding of Salerno, supra, 
and United States v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108 (CA 3 1977), that "the 
intent and expectation of the district court judge who sentences 
-5-
under [§ 4205(a)] ••• are controlling and ••• must be searched 
out to detennine if relief may be ordered under 28 u.s.c. 
§ 2255." The court ruled that Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, which authorizes 
a sentencing judge to reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
sentence or final unsuccessful appeal, was not the exclusive 
avenue for sentence reduction, but merely an alternative to 
the § 2255 route. Speaking in rather broad, jurisprudential 
terms, the court stated that its decision was grounded in the 
''moral" principle that "a sentencing judge's intent and probable 
expectations should be vindicated to the fullest extent possible." 
Accordingly, where a prisoner is required to serve an appreciably 
longer term of imprisonment because subsequently adopted parole 
guidelines effect a provable frustration of the intentions and 
expectations of the trial court, "regard for the integrity of 
'- the sentencing court, as well as concepts of decency and fair 
play, dicatate that that court should be in a position to 
vindicate those original intentions and expectations." Petn 9a. 
Turning to the Addonizio case, the court found that the 
Commission's consideration of the nature and circumstances of 
the offense, after the sentencing judge had considered these 
factors in setting the maximum punishment, amounted in effect 
7 to double punishment. "Society cannot have it both ways; it 
cannot expose one to a harsh maximum ••• and then, years later, 
for precisely the same reason which caused the harsh maximmn 
to be imposed, impose a doubly harsh minimum." Petn. 18a. 
Despite the potentially broad implicati~n of the "frustration 
of expectations" theory, the court observed in a footnote that 
rule of the CA 3 was confined to cases where the sentencing had 
occured prior to an unforeseen change in Parole Commission policy. 
Petn. 18a. n. 10. 
-6-
With respect to Whelan's and Flahe·rty' s appeals, the 
~ court remanded Judge Biunno's denial of their § 2255 petition for 
reconsideration in light of the Addonizio ruling. The court found 
that Judge Muir had stated the correct standard of review 
under § 2241, and could see no basis to upset the application 
of that standard to the facts. 
CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that the circuits are deeply 
divided over the extent to which sentencing courts may revise 
-::...---
sentences in response to parole decisions. The CA 3, in the 
present case, appears to have adopted the view that a sentencing 
court can vindicate its expectations whenever the Commission 
alters the standards under which it exercises discretion. The 
CA 8, in Edwards v. United States, 574 F.2d 937 (1978), ~· 
pending, No. 78-157, has taken the view that courts may revise 
sentences imposed before 1973 under§ 4205(b)(2), which makes 
the offender immediately eligible for parole. The CA 1, CA 2, 
CA 6, CA 7, and CA 9 have held that setencing courts have no 
authority to revise lawful sentences in response to parole 
decisions. These courts hold that it makes no difference that 
the sentence was imposed before a change in Commission policy, 
or that the judge's sentencing expectations were frustrated. 
See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 560 F.2d 7 (CA 1 1977). 
On the merits, the SG argues that the CA 3's position 
is grounded in three erroneous legal and factual assumptions. 
First, the court erred in assuming that sentencing expecta-
tions may be vindicated on a §- 2255 motion. This section ~equires 
a claim that the sentence was in violation of the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or that the sentencing court was 
without jurisdiction, or that the sentence was in excess of 
,.-
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the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence "is other-
wise subject to collateral attack." The "subject to collateral 
attack" provision is not a carch-all that authorizes courts 
to do whatever they believe is required in the interests of 
justice. "[T]he appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed 
error of law [is] 'a fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Davis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). The SG maintains that the 
denial of parole in these cases did not amount to a "complete 
miscarriage of justice." Moreover, the SG repeats the argu-
ment made below that Fed. R. Crim P. 35 provides the only 
basis by which a sentencing court can reduce an otherwise 
lawful sentence. 
Second, the SG maintains that the CA erred in assuming 
<-
that it is properly' within province of the sentencing court 
to have "expectations" about how the Commission will exercise 
its discretion within the limits established by the sentence. 
The SG points out that sentencing authority is divided between -
the three branches of the Government: the Legislature fixes the 
ranges within which sentence may be imposed; the Judiciary 
imposes sentence in each case, selecting a maximum and miaimum 
punishment within the range authorized by Congress; and the 
Executive, acting through the Parole Co~~ission, determines 
the exact date a£ release. As the CA 1 put it, permitting 
a district court to revise a sentence whenever the Parole 
Commission's decision is inconsistent with the court's intent 
"divest[s] the Commission of its discretionary power under the 
law, and defeat[s] the objectives of placing the parole decision 





Finally, the SG presents statistics purporting to show 
that the CA erred in assuming that prior to 1973 the Commission 
paid little or no attention to the gravity of the offense in 
determining whether to release prisoners on parole. Figures 
derived by the Commission from computer coded information reveal 
that in 1970, the year Addonizio was sentenced, of persons 
with no prison disciplinary infractions, 21.8% were released 
after one-third of their sentences, 16.7% were released sometime 
after the one-third point, and 61.5% were held until mandatory 
release. If the sample is confined to first offenders, 42.2% 
were released at one-third, 27.9% were released after one-
third, and 29.9% were held until mandatory release. According 
to the SG, these figures indicate that,if the courts below 
had an "expectation" that prisoners with good institutional 
records and little danger of recidivism were invariably paroled 
at one-third of their sentence, they were mistaken. 
Resp. Addonizio concedes that there is a conflict among 
the circuits. However, he argues that the rule of the CA 3 
is confined to the circumstances created by the new parole 
guidelines, and as such the rule will effect an ever decreasing 
number of inmates. The impact of the decision below is there-
fore narrow and does not warrant this Court's attention. In 
addition, resp. notes that, because this Court reinstated the 
order of the DC releasing Addonizio after it · was stayed by 
theCA, 431 U.S. 909 (1977), he has been out of prison since 
May 12, 1977. Under the circumstances, it would be "unjust and 
unreasonable" to subject him again to uncertainty about his 
future. 
-9-
DISCUSSION: This petn. should be considered together 
with United States v. Edwards, No~ 78-157, and Bonanno v. 
United States, No. 77-1665. The circuits are split over I 
the general question whether a sentencing court may vindicate 
its sentencing expectations after a change in Parole Commission 
policy (Addonizio); over whether .sentencing review is avail-
able in § 4205(b)(2) cases, if not § 4205(a) and § 4205(b)(l) 
cases (Edwards); and over whether sentencing expectations can 
be vindicated in § 2241 proceedings, if not § 2255 proceedings 
(Bonanno). 
The present case appears . to present an important issue 
concerning the appropriate allocation of responsibility in 
the federal system of sentencing and parole. Resp.'s suggestion 
that the impact of the decision below will be quite limited 
should be greeted with scepticism in light of the experience 
of the CA 8, which was inundated with "a flood of pro se § 2255 
motions" after a similar decision. Jacobson v. United States, 
542 F.2d 725, 727 (1976). Moreover, as the SG notes, the 
Commission's guidelines are subject to periodic study and re-
) 
v~sio~, and under the rationale of the CA 3, every future modifica-
t~on ~n the guidelines would lead to a new wave of collateral 
attacks on parole decisions o 
Grant. There is a response from resp. Addonizio. 
9/13/78 Merrill DC, CA ops. in petn. 
~~~ 
@ 7<i-IS"7 tl..S'. ·v~~,qJT) _ 
BB 12/1/78 56-~~ k ~.5.AU-~ 
{i) 77-/t,&S, ~~ . 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-156, United States v. Addonizio 
The SG has filed a Second Supplemental Memorandum 
in the case. In it, he calls the attention of the Court to a 
recent decision of the CA 8, ~ bane. In that case, the CA 8 
adhered to its position that courts may reduce sentences in 
response to changes in Parole Comm'n policies. But the CA 8 
limited this~uthority to reduce sentences to cases in which 
defendants had been sentenced prior to the adoption of the 
Parole Comm'n's guidelines, under 18 U.S.C. §4205(b)(2) (maximum 
but no minimum sentence). 
CA 8 
The SG reads this decision as an overruling of the 
decison in United States v. Edwards, petn for cert. 
Edwards, the court held that a sentence imposed 
U.S.C. §4205(b)(l) (min1(mum sentence set by sentencing 
judge at less than one-third of maximum sentence) must be 
reduced if changes in Parole Comm'n policy frustrate the 
sentencing court's 
in No. 78-157. 
2. 
The SG points out that the resps in the present case 
were sentenced under 18 u.s.c. §4205(a) (sentencing judge sets 
maximum sentence, and defendant is eligible for parole only 
after serving one-third of the sentence, or ten years of a 
sentence greater than 30 years). He points out that the 
decision of the CA 3 that such sentences could be reduced 
on account of subsequent changes in Parole Comm'n policy 
is in conflict with the recent en bane decision of the CA 8. 
The SG also comments that if this case is granted 
along with Bonnano, No. 77-1665, the cases could be 
consolidated and argued in a single hour. 
uecemoer o, 1 '::J 1 o 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ...... . ........... , 19 . . . No. 78-156 




Rellsted. (Note response requested in No. /8 157 
dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 60.) 
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-./' Powell, J............... . . . . . . . . . .. 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . .V . . . . . . . . 
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Recirculated~------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'l'ATES 
No. 78-156 
United States, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to the United ~ 
v. States Court of Appeals for the 
Hugh J. Addonizio et al. Third Circuit. 
{May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change 
in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has 
prolonged their actual imprisonment beyond the period in-
tended by the sentencing judge. The question presented is 
whether this type of allegation will support a collateral attack 
on the original sentence under 18 U. S. C. § 2255.1 We hold 
that it will not. 
I 
With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before 
1 28 U. S. C. § 2255 provides: 
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sen-
tence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, 
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or-
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which im-
posed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
"If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, 
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open 
to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of 
the constitutional rights of the prisonPr as to render the judgment vulnera-
ble to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment. aside 
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial 






2 UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO 
us are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we 
accept for purposes of decision Addonizio's view of the facts 
and the relevant aspects of the Parole Commission's practices. 
After his conviction in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, on September 22, 1970, 
Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine 
of $25,000. Factors which led the District Judge to impose 
that sentence included the serious character of Addonizio's 
offenses/ and the Judge's expectation that exemplary institu-
2 At the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated: 
"Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio's record of public serv-
ice] ... is his conviction by a jury in this court of crimes of monumental 
proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely be exaggerated and the 
commission of which create the gravest implications for our form of 
government. 
"Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been convicted of 
one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive counts of extorting 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons doing business with the City 
of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of this magnitude, I suggest to you, 
Mr. HeUring [defense counsell, could have never succeeded without the 
then-Mayor Addonizio's approval and participation. 
"These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for which 
Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted represent a 
pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic criminal extortion over 
a period of many years, claiming many victims and touching many more 
lives. 
"Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed govern-
mental officials are certainty not novel to the law, but the corruption dis-
closed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by the frightening 
alliance of criminal elements and public officials, and it is this very kind 
of totally destructive conspiracy that was conceived, organized and exe-
cuted by these defendants. 
" . . . It is impossible to estimate the impact upon-and the cost of-these 
criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark, and, indeed, to the citizens 
of the State of New Jersey, in terms of their frustration, despair and 
disillusionment. 
"Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very heart of 
our civili~ed form of government and of our society. The people will not 
-78-156-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO 
tional behavior would lead to Addonizio's release when hE} 
became eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sen-
tence.8 The judge did not contemplate that the Parole Com.,. 
mission might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reasoR 
for refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive. 
In 1973 the Parole Commission markedly changed its 
policies.4 Under its new practices the seriousness of the 
offense became a significant factor in determining whether a 
prisoner should be granted parole. Addonizio became eligible 
for parole on July 3, 1975. After hearings, the Parole Com-
tolerate such conduct at any level of government, and those who use thei.t 
public office to betray the public trust in this manner can expect from the 
courts only the gravest consequences. 
"It is, accordingly, the sentences of this Court that the defendant Hugh 
J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General 
of the United States for a term of ten years, and that, additionally, the 
defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a fine of $25,000. That is all." 
573 F. 2d, at 154. 
8 In his opinion granting Addonizio relief under § 2255 in 1977, Judge 
Barlow stated: 
"At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that petition~r 
would receive a meaningful parole hearing-that is, a determination based 
on his institutional record and the likelihood of recidivism-upon the com-
pletion of one-third (VJ) of his sentence. The Court anticipated-assum-
ing an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while con-
fined-that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approxi-
mately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence, in view of 
the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to be little 
probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the case and his per-
sonal and social history. This sentencing expectation was based on the 
Court's understanding-which was consistent with generally-held notions-
of the operation of the parole system in 1970." Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a. 
4 The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in 1972 
and started to apply them throughout the nation in November 1973. See 
38 Fed. Reg. 31942. The Commission's present guidelines are codified at 
·28 CFR § 2.20. The use of guidelines is now required by statute. See 
18 U. S. C. §§ 4203 (a) (1) and 4206 (a). 
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mission twice refused to release 'him, expressly basing its 
refusal on the serious character of his crimes.5 
Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court's juris-
diction under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing. 
Following the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Salerno, 538 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court ac-
cepted jurisdiction, found that the Parole Commission had 
not given Addonizio the kind of "meaningful parole hearing" 
that the judge had anticipated when sentence was imposed, 
and reduced his sentence to the time already served. The 
judge stated that he had "anticipated-assuming an appro-
priate institutional adjustment and good behavior while con-
fined-that ·[Addonizio] would be actually confined for a 
5 As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit, the com-
ments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977, explaining 
its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the reasons given by the trial 
judge at the time sentence was imposed. The Commission stated: 
"Your offenBe behavior has been rated as very high severity. Your silent 
factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total of 57 months at time 
of hearing. Guidelines established by the Commission for adult cases 
which consider the above factors suggest a range of 25-36 months to be 
served before release for cases with good institutional adjustment . After 
careful consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, a 
decision above the guidelines appears warranted because your offense was 
part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which 
consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and approximately 
14 other co-conspirators. As the highest elected official in the City of 
Newark, you were convicted of an extortion conspiracy in which, under 
color of your official authority, you and your co-conspirators conspired to 
delay, impede, obstruct, and otherwise thwart construction in the City 
ef Newark in order to obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of 
working on city construction projects. 
"Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted totalling approxi-
mately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent citizens of Newark, and 
because the offense involved a serious breach of public trust over a sub-
stantial period of time, a decision above the guidelines is warranted. 
Parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and 
promote disrespect for the law."· 573 F . 2d, at 153-154 . 
• .. . 
'78-156-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO 
period of approximately three and one-half to four years of 
the ten-year sentence." This "sentencing expectation'• wrus 
frustrated by the Parole Commission's subsequent adoptil))n of 
new standards and procedures. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F. 2d 147. Because 
of a conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding 
that § 2255 does not give district courts this type of resentenc-
ing authority,6 we granted the Government's petition for cer-
tiorari in Addonizio's case and in the consolidated case of 
two other prisoners in which similar relief was granted.7 
II 
We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider 
the Government's alternative argument that the significance 
of the changes in the Parole Commission's procedures has been 
exaggerated because it always attached some weight to the 
character of the offense in processing parole applications. 
Nor do we have any occasion to consider whether the new 
guidelines are consistent with the Parole Commission and 
6 Bonanno v. United States, Civ. No.- (CA9 1978), cert. granted,-
U. S. - (Dec. 11, 1978), cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, - U. S. 
- (Feb. 1, 1979). 
7 In United States v. Whelan & Flaherty, two federal prisoners filed 
motions under §§ 2241 and 2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241 
motion was denied by the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
573 F. 2d 147, and Whelan and Flaherty did not seek further review. In 
the § 2255 motion, which is at issue here, the respondents claimed that 
the Parole Commission's action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who 
had originally sentenced them and who had since died. The case was 
assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that "the real issue is 
whether the Parole Commission's denial of parole was arbitrary and capri-
cious," Pet. App., at 35a, and concluded that it was not . The Court of 
Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to reconsider the 
case to determine whether Judge Shaw's sentencing intent had been frus-
trated. Proceedings on remand have resulted in the release of both 
respondents. 
78-156-0PINION 
6 UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO 
Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219; 8 or whether their 
enforcement may violate the Ex Post Factor Clause of the 
Clause of the Constitution.9 
III 
When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the pro-
cedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment 
entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to 
modify the basic distinction between direct review and col-
lateral review. It has, of course, long been settled law that 
an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not 
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.1 () 
The reasons for na.rrowly limiting the grounds for collateral 
attack on final judgments a.re well known and basic to our 
adversary system of justice.11 · The question in this case is 
whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental 
to come within those narrow limits. 
Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to dis-
charge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it "was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
8 See Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3 
1978). 
0 See Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission and Metropolitan 
Center, slip op. No. 78-2051 (CA7 Mar. 20, 1979) . 
10 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 ("Of 
course the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal. .. . 
This rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be 
maintained."); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 181-182; Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424. 
11 Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the 
intE.'grity of our procedures. See, e. g., Bator, Finality In Cnminal Law 
And Federal Habeas Coqms For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 
451-453 (1963). Moreover, increased volume of judicial work associated 
with the procE'SSing of collateral attacks inevitably impairl:l and delay;; the 
orderly administration of justice. BecausE' there is no limit on the time 
when a colJatNal attack may be made, evidentiary hearing;; are often in-
conclusive and retrials may be impossible if the a.ttack is :succr;;:sful. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491 n. 31; Henderson v. Kibbe, 4:31 U. S. 
145, 154 n. 13. 
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sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, 
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." This statute was 
intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions 
filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by 
providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. United States v. Hay-
man, 342 U. S. 205, 216--217. 
While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does 
not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing. 
·Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions 
and sentences entered by a court without jurisdiction. See, 
e. g., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-203 (MARSHALL, C. 
J.). In later years, the availability of the writ was expanded 
to encompass claims of constitutional error as well. See 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104-105; Brown v. Allen, 
344 U. S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of juris-
diction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack 
has remained far more limited. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 
465, 477 n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law 
does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed 
error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428. 
Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of 
fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255 
proceeding, as amicus here points out/~ is that traditionally 
they could have been raised by a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis, and thus fall within §2255's provision for vacating sen-
tences that are "otherwise subject to collateral attack." But 
coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors of 
.fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing "in those 
cases where the errors were of the most fundamental charac-
ter, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular 
and invalid." United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69. 
12 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lewisburg Prison Project, at 10-12. 
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Thus, the writ of coram nobis was "available to bring before 
the court that pronounced the judgment errors in matters 
of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and 
were material to the validity and regularity of the legal pro-
ceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under age, ap-
peared by an attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a 
married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or dies 
before verdict of interlocutory judgment." Id., at 68. 
The claimed error here-that the judge was incorrect in 
his assumptions about the future course of parole pro-
ceedings-does not meet any of the established standards of 
collateral attack. There is no claim of a constitutional viola-
tion; the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits; 
and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or 
law of the "fundamental" character that renders the entire 
proceeding irregular and invalid. 
The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude dis-
tinguishes Addonizio's claim from those in prior cases, upon 
which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted. 
Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, for example, like this 
case, involved a claim that a judgment that was lawful when 
it was entered should be set aside because of a later develop-
ment. The subsequent development in that case, however, 
was a change in the substantive law that established that the 
conduct for which petitioner had been convicted and sen-
tenced was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence 
would surely have been a "complete miscarriage of justice" 
since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful. The 
change in Parole Commission policies involved in this case 
is not of the same character: this change affected the way in 
which the court's judgment and sentence would be performed 
but it did not affect the lawfulness of the judgment itself-
then or now. Nor is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 
analogous to the present case. In that case, the Court 
10rdered resentencing of a defendant whose original sentence 
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had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions 
secured without the assistance of counsel. But the error 
underlying the sentence in Tucker, as the Court emphasized, 
was "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." Id., at 
447. We have held that the constitutional right to the assist-
ance of counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convic-
tions serve as the basis for enhanced punishment. Burgett v. 
Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115. Whether or not the Parole Com .. 
mission action in this case was constitutional, a question not 
presented here, there is no claim that the action taken by the 
sentencing judge was unconstitutional, or was based on "mis-
information of constitutional magnitude." 
Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio's 
claim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to 
all of the objective criteria-federal jurisdiction, the Constitu-
tion, and federal law-the sentence was and is a lawful one. 
And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the 
grounds for collateral attack to include claims based not on 
any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of 
the subjective intent of the sentencing judge. 
As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing 
judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the 
validity of his judgment. The record made when Judge Barlow 
pronounced sentence against Addonizio, for example, is en-
tirely consistent with the view that the Judge then thought 
that this was an exceptional case in which the severity of 
Addonizio's offense should and would be considered carefully 
by the Parole Commission when Addonizio became eligible 
for parole. If the record is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion 
is not filed until years later, it will often be difficult to recon-
struct with any certainty the subjective intent of the judge 
at the time of sentencing. Regular attempts to do so may well 
increase the risk of inconsistent treatment of defe11dants; on 
the other hand, the implementation of the Parole Commis-
·sion's policies may reduce that risk. 
78-156-0PINION 
10 UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO 
Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts 
to engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the con~ 
trary, the proposed system of sentencing review would be 
inconsistent with that established by Congress. The decision 
as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be 
released has been committed by Congress, with certain limita-
tions, to the discretion of the Parole Commission.13 Whether 
wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in 
the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and 
in doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing prac-
tices of individual judges.14 The authority of sentencing judges 
to select precise release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited: 
the judge may select an early parole eligibility date, but that 
guarantees only that the defendant will be considered at that 
time by the Parole Commission.15 And once a sentence has 
13 A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of his maxi-
mum sentence less "good time" computed according to 18 U. S. C. § 4161. 
In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than five years' imprisonment 
is entitled to be released on parole after serving two-thirds of each con-
secutive term or 30 years, whichever is first, unless the Commission deter-
mines that the prisoner "has seriously or frequently violated institutional 
rules" or that there is a reasonable probability that he would commit 
further crimes. 18 U.S. C.§ 4206 (d). The Commission has substantial 
discretion to determine whether a pri::mner should be released on parole, 
once he is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by statute. 
18 U. S. C. § 4203 (1970), in effect when Addonizio was sentenced, 
provided: 
"If it appears to the Board ... that there is a reasonable probability that 
such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and 
if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release 
of such prisoner on parole." 
Under the statute now in effect, 18 U. S. C. § 4206, the Commission is to 
consider the risk of recidivism and whether "release would . . . depreciate 
the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for the law." 
14 See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., .1st Sess., Hl 
' (1975). 
15 The trial court may set a defendant's eligibility for parole at any 
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been imposed, the trial judge's authority to modify it is also 
circumscribed. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure now authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence 
within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed 
on appeal.' 0 The time period, however, is jurisdictional and 
may not be extended.17 
The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has 
no enforcible expectations with respect to the actual release 
of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The 
judge may well have expectations as to when release is likely. 
But the actual decision is not his to make, either at the time 
of sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To re-
quire the Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial 
expectations, and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for 
ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would sub-
point up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed, see 18 U. S. C. 
§ 4205 (a), (b) (1976); 18 U. S. C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970). Whether the 
defendant will actually br paroled at that time is the decision of the 
Parole Commission. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 47 ("the 
extent of a federal prisoner's confinement is initially determined by the 
sentencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally 
prescribed range; release on parole is then available on review by the 
United States Parole Commission, which, as a general rule, may condi-
tionally release a prisoner any time after he serves one-third of the judi-
cially-fixed term."). The trial judge is precluded from effectively usurping 
that function by splitting a lengthy sentence between a stated period of 
probation and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a 
sentence entailing incarceration of more than six months. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3651 (2) (1976). 
16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such author-
ity: "The beginning of the service of the sentence in a criminal case ends 
the power of the court even in the same term to change it." United 
States v. Murray , 275 U. S. 347, 358. This rule was applied even though 
the change related only to the second of a pair of consecutive sentences 
which itself was not being served at the time. Affronti v. United States, 
'350 U. S. 79. 
17 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45 (b) ; United States v. Robinson, 361 
u. s. 220. 
' I 
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stantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust re-
lease determinations to the Commision and not the courts. 
Nothing in § 2255 supports-let alone mandates-such a 
frustration of congressional intent. 
Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the 
validity of the Parole Commission's actions, either in promul-
gating its new guidelines or in denying Addonizio's applica-
tions for parole, we hold that subsequent actions taken by the 
Parole Commission-whether or not such actions accord with 
a trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing-do not 
retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment itself. 
The facts alleged by the prisoners in these cases do not pro-
vide a basis for a collateral attack on their respective sentences 
pursuant to § 2255. 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore 
reversed. 
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No. 78-156 
United States, Petitioner, )On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
v. States Court of Appeals for the 
Hugh J. Addonizio et al. Third Circuit. 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change 
in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has 
prolonged their actual imprisonment beyond the period in-
tended by the sentencing judge. The question presented is 
whether this type of allegation will support a collateral attack 
on the original selltence under 18 U. S. C. § 2255.1 We hold 
that it will not. 
I 
With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before 
1 28 U.S. C.§ 2255 provides: 
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming thf' right to be released upon the ground that the sen-
tence was imposed in violation of thf' Constitution or laws of the Unitf'd 
StatE's, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, 
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or 
is otherwise subject. to collateral attack, may move the court which im-
posed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
"If the court finds that the judgm<>nt was rendered without jurisdiction, 
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open 
to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of 
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnera-
ble to collateral attack, the court sha ll vacate and set the judgment aside 
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial 
or correct the sentence as may appea r appropriate." 
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us are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we 
accept for purposes of decision Addonizio's . view of the facts 
and the relevant aspects of the Parole Commission's practices. 
After his conviction in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, on September 22, 1970, 
Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine 
of $25,000. Factors which led the District Judge to impose 
that sentence included the serious character of Addonizio's 
offenses,2 and the Judge's expectation that exemplary institu-
2 At the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated: 
"Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio's record of public serv-
ice] ... is his conviction by a jury in this court of crimes of monumental 
proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely be exaggerated and the 
commission of which create the gravest implications for our form of 
government. 
"Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been convicted of 
one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive counts of extorting 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons doing business with the City 
of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of this magnitude, I suggest to you, 
Mr. Hell ring [defense counsel], could have never succeeded without the 
then-Mayor Addonizio's approval and participation. 
"These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for which 
Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted represent a 
pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic criminal extortion over 
a period of many years, claiming many victims and touching many more 
lives. 
"Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed govern-
mental officials are certainty not novel to the law, but the corruption dis-
closed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by the frightening 
alliance of criminal Plements and public officials, and it is this very kind 
of totally destructive conspiracy that was conceived, organized and exe. 
cuted by these defendants. 
" ... It is impossible to estimate the impact upon-and the cost of-these 
criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark, and, indeed, to the citizens 
of the State of New Jersey, in terms of their frustration, despair and 
disillusionment. 
"Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very heart of 
· our civilized form of government and of our society. The people will not 
: 
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tional behavior would lead to Addonizio's release when he 
became eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sen-
tence.3 The judge did not contemplate that the Parole Com-
mission might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reason 
for refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive. 
In 1973 the Parole Commission markedly changed its 
policies.4 Under its new practices the gravity of the offense l 
became a significant factor in determining whether a pris-
oner should be granted parole. Addonizio became eligible 
for parole on July 3, 1975. After hearings, the Parole COm-
tolerate such conduct at any level of government, and those who use their 
public office to betray the public trust in this manner can expect from the 
courts only the gravest consequences. 
"It is, accordingly, the sentences of this Court that the defendant Hugh 
J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General 
of the United States for a term of ten years, and that, additionally, the 
defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a fine of $25,000. That is all." 
573 F. 2d, at 154. 
sIn his opinion granting Addonizio relief under § 2255 in 1977, Judge 
Barlow r,tated: 
"At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that petitioner 
would receive a meaningful parole hearing-that is, a determination based 
on his institutional record and the likelihood of recidivism-upon the com-
pletion of one-third (Y:J) of his sentence. The Court anticipated-assum-
ing an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while con-
fined-that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approxi-
mately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence, in view of 
the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to be little 
probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the case and his per-
sonal and social history. This sentencing expectation was based on the 
Court's understanding-which was consistent with generally-held notions-
of the operation of the parole system in 1970." Pet. for Cert. 28a~29a. 
4 The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in 1972 
and started to apply them throughout the nation in November 1973. See 
38 Fed. Reg. 31942. The Commission's present guidelines are codified at 
28 CFR § 2.20. The use of guidelines iR now required by statute. See 
l8 U.S. C.§§ 4203 (a) (1) and ·1206 (a). 
·" 
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mission twice refused to release him, expressly basing its 
refusal on the serious character of his crimes.5 
Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court's juris-
diction under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing. 
Following the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Salerno, 538 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court ac-
cepted jurisdiction, found that the Parole Commission had 
not given Addonizio the kind of "meaningful parole hearing" 
that the judge had anticipated when sentence was imposed, 
and reduced his sentence to the time already served. The 
judge stated that he had "anticipated-assuming an appro-
priate institutional adjustment and good behavior while con-
fined-that [Addonizio] would be actually confined for a 
5 As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit, the com-
ments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977, explaining 
its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the reasons given by the trial 
judge at the time sentence was imposed. The Commission stated: 
"Your offense behavior has been rated· as very high severity. Your silent 
factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total of 57 months at time 
of hearing. Guidelines established oy the Commission for adult cases 
which consider the above factors suggest a range of 25-36 months to be 
served before release Jor cases with good institutional adjustment. After 
careful consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, a 
decision above the guidelines appears warranted because your offense was 
part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which 
consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and approximately 
14 other co-conspirators. As the highest elected official in the City of 
Newark, you were convicted of an extortion conspiracy in which, under 
color of your official authority, you and your co-conspirators conspired to 
delay, impede, obstruct, and otherwise thwart construction in the City 
of Newark in order to obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of 
working on city construction projects. 
"Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted totalling approxi-
mately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent citizens of Newark, and 
because the offense involved a serious breach of public trust over a sub-
stantial period of time, a decision above the guidelines is warranted. 
Parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and 
r>romote disrespect for the law." 573 F. 2d, at 153-154. 
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period of approximately three and one-half to four years of 
the ten-year sentence." This "sentencing expectation" was 
frustrated by the Parole Commission's subsequent adoption of 
new standards and procedures. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F. 2d 147. Because 
of a conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding 
that § 2255 does not give district courts this type of resentenc-
ing authority, 6 we granted the Government's petition for cer-
tiorari in Addonizio's case and in the consolidated case of 
two other prisoners in which similar relief was granted.7 
II 
We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider 
the Government's alternative argument that the significance 
of the changes in the Parole Commission's procedures has been 
exaggerated because it always attached some weight to the 
character of the offense in processing parole applications. 
Nor do we have any occasion to consider whether the new 
guidelines are consistent with the Parole Commission and 
6 Bonanno v. United States, Civ. No.- (CA9 1978), cert. granted,-
U. S.- (Dec. 11, 1978), cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60,- U.S. 
- (Feb. 1, 1979). 
7 In United States v. Whelan & Flaherty, two federal prisoners filed 
motions under §§ 2241 and 2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241 
motion was denied by the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
573 F. 2d 147, and Whelan and Flaherty did not seek further review. In 
the § 2255 motion, which is at issue here, the respondents claimed that 
the Parole Commission's action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who 
had originally sentenced them and who had since died. The case was 
assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that "the real issue is 
whether the Parole Commission's denial of parole was arbitrary and capri-
cious," Pet. App., at 35a, and concluded that it was not. The Court of 
Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to reconsider the 
case to determine whether Judge Shaw's sentencing intent had been frus-
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Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219; 8 or whether their ) 
enforcement may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
Constitution.0 
III 
When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the pro-
cedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment 
entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to 
modify the basic distinction between direct review and col-
lateral review. It has, of course, long been settled law that 
an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not 
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.10 
The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral 
attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our 
adversary system of justice.11 The question in this case is 
whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental 
to come within those narrow limits. 
Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to dis-
charge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it "was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
8 See Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3 
1978). 
0 See Rodriguez v. United States Pamle Commission and Metropolitan 
Center, slip op. No. 78-2051 (CA7 Mar. 20, 1979). 
10 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 ("Of 
course the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal. ... 
This rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be 
maintained."); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 181-182; Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424. 
11 Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the 
integrity of our procedurrs. Ser, e. g., F. James, Civil Procedure 517- j 
518 ( 1965). Moreover. incrra~ed volume of judicial work associated 
with the processing of collateral !Lttacks inevitably impairs and delays the 
orderly administration of justice. Because there is no limit on the time 
when a collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearing:; are oft('n in-
conclusive and retrials may be impo:SSible if the attack is succe sful. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 49l n. 31; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 
145, 154 n. 13, 
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sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, 
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." This statute was 
intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions 
filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by 
providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. United States v. Hay~ 
man, 342 U. S. 205, 216-217. 
While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does 
not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing. 
Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions 
and sentences entered by a court without jurisdiction. See, 
e. g. , Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-203 (MARSHALL, C. 
J.). In later years, the availability of the writ was expanded 
to encompass claims of constitutional error as well. See 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104-105; Brown v. Allen, 
344 U. S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of juris-
diction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack 
has remained far more limited. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 
465, 477 n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law 
does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed 
error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428. 
Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of 
fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255-
proceeding, as amicus here points out/2 is that traditionally 
they could have been raised by a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis, and thus fall within § 2255's provision for vacating sen-
tences that are "otherwise subject to collateral attack." But 
coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors of 
fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing "in those 
cases where the errors were of the most fundamental charac-
ter, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular· 
and invalid." United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69. 
l 2 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lewi::;burg Prison Project, at 10-12. 
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Thus, the writ of coram nobis was "available to bring before 
thE' court that pronounced the juclgmcnt E'nors in matters 
of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and 
were material to the validity and regularity of the legal pro-
ceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under age, ap-
peared by an attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a 
married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or dies 
before verdict of interlocutory judgment." !d., at 68. 
The claimed error here-that the judge was incorrect iri 
his assumptions about the future course of parole pro-
ceedings-does not meet any of the established standards of 
collateral attack. There is no claih1 of a constitutional viola-" 
tion; the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits; 
and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or 
law of the "fundamental" character that renders the entire 
proceeding irregular and invalid; 
The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude dis-
tinguishes Addonizio's claim from tfiose in prior cases, upon 
which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted, 
Davis v. United States, 4'17 U. S. 333, for example, like this 
case, involved a claim that a judgment that was lawful whe1i 
it was entered should be set aside because of a later develop-
ment. The subsequent development . in that case, however, 
was a change in the substantive law. that established that th~ 
conduct for which petitioner had b.een convicted and sen-
tenced was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence 
would surely have been a "complete miScarriage of justice" 
since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful. · The 
change in Parole Commission policies involved in this case 
is not of the same character: t}1is change affected the way in 
which the court's judgment and sentence would be performed 
but it did not affect the lawfulness of th.e judgment itself-
then or now. Nor is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 
analog<;JUs to the present case.. In that case, the Court 
ordered resentencing of a defen'clant whose original sentence 
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had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions 
secured without the assistance of counsel. But the error 
underlying the sentence in Tucker, as the Court emphasized, 
was "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." I d., at 
447. We have held that the constitutional right to the assist-
ance of counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convic-
tions serve as the basis for enhanced punishment. Burgett v. 
Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115. Whether or not the Parole Com-
mission action in this case was constitutional, a question not 
presented here, there is no claim that the action taken by the 
seutencing judge was unconstitutional, or was based on "mis-
information of constitutional magnitude." 
Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio's 
daim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to 
all of the objective criteria-federal jurisdiction, the Constitu-
tion, and federal law-the sentence was and is a lawful one. 
And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the 
grounds for collateral a.ttack to include claims based not on 
any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of 
the subjective intent of the sentencing judge. 
As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing 
judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the 
validity of his judgment. The record made when Judge Barlow 
pronounced sentence against Addonizio, for example, is en-
tirely consistent with the view that the Judge then thought 
that this was an exceptional case in which the severity of 
Addonizio's offense should and would be considered carefully 
by the Parole Commission when Addonizio became eligible 
for parole. If the record is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion 
is not filed until years later, it will often be difficult to recon-
struct with any certainty the subjective intent of the judge 
at the time of sentencing. Regular attempts to do so may well 
increase the risk of inconsistent treatment of defendants; orr 
the other hand, the implementation of the Parole Commis-
sion's policies may reduce that risk. 
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Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts 
to engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the con-
trary, the proposed system of sentencing review would be 
inconsistent with that established by Congress. The decision 
as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be 
released has been committed by Congress, with certain limita-
tions, to the discretion of the Parole Commission.13 Whether 
wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in 
the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and 
in doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing prac-
tices of individual judges.14 The authority of sentencing judges 
to select precise release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited: 
the judge may select an early parole eligibility date, but that 
guarantees only that the defendant will be considered at that 
time by the Parole Commission.15 And once a sentence has 
13 A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of his maxi-
mum sentence less "good time" computed according to 18 U. S. C. § 4161. 
In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than five years' imprisonment 
is entitled to be released on parole after serving two-thirds of each con-
secutive term or 30 years, whichever is first, unless the Commission deter-
mines that the prisoner "has seriously or frequently violated institutional 
rules" or that there is a reasonable probability that he would commit 
further crimes. 18 U.S. C.§ 4206 (d). The Commission has substantial 
discretion to determine whether a. prisoner should be released on parole, 
once he is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by statute. 
18 U. S. C. § 4203 (1970), in effect when Addonizio was sentenced, 
provided : 
"If it appears to the Board ... that there is a reasonable probability that 
such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and 
if in the opinion of the Board such releasP is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society, the Board m1ty in itA discretion authorize the release 
of such prisoner on parole." 
Under the statute now in effect, 18 U. S. C. § 4206, the Commission is to 
consider the risk of recidivism and whethPr "release would ... dPpreciate 
the seriousnPss of [the] offen~e or promote disrespect for the law." 
tJ See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 
~1975). 
~5 The trial court may set a defendant's ehgibility for parole at any 
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been imposed, the trial ,judge's authority to modify it is also 
circumscribed. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure now authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence 
within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed 
on appeal.16 The time period, however, is jurisdictional and 
may not be extended.17 
The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has 
no enforcible expectations with respect to the actual release 
of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The 
judge may well have expectations as to when release is likely. 
But the actual decision is not his to make, either at the time 
of sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To re-
quire the Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial 
expectations, and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for 
ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would sub-
point up to one-third of the maximum sentrnce imposed, see 18 U. S. C. 
§ 4205 (a), (b) (1976); 18 U. S. C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970). Whether the 
defendant will actually be paroled at that timr is the decision of the 
Parole Commission. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 47 ("the 
extent of a federal prisoner's confinement i~; initially determined by the 
.;entencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally 
prescribed ran~e; release on parole iH then available on review by the 
United Statr · Parole Commi"sion, which, as a grneral rule, may condi-
tionally release a prisoner any time after he serves one-third of the judi-
cially-fixed term."). The trial judgr is precluded from effectively usurping 
that function by splitting a lengthy sentencP between a stated prriod of 
probation and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a 
sentence entailing incarceration of more than six months . 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3651 (2) (1976). 
16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such author-
ity: "The be~mning of the srrvice of the srntence in a criminal case end~; 
the power of the court even in the sanw term to change it ." Uuited 
States v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347, 358. This rule was applied even though 
the change related only to the second of a pair of consecutive sentrnces 
wl11eh itself wa<> not being served at the time. Aff1'onU v. United States, 
350 U. S. 79. 
17 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45 (b) , United States v. Robin.son, 361 
U. S. 220 
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stantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust re-
lease determinations to the Commision and not the courts. 
Nothing in § 2255 supports-let alone mandates-such a 
frustration of congressional iutent. 
Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the 
validity of the Parole Commission's actions, either in promul-
gating its new guidelines or in denying Addonizio's applica-
tions for parole, we hold that subsequent actions taken by the 
Parole Commission-whether or not such actions accord with 
a trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing-do not 
retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment itself. 
The facts alleged by the prisoners in these cases do not pro-
vide a basis for a collateral attack on their respective sentences 
pursuant to ~ 2255. 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore 
reversed. 
MR. JFS'l'ICE BRENNAN took no part in the decision of this 
case. 
MR . .Jrs'riCE PowELL took ttO part in the consideration or 
drrision of this casr. 
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